The Muslim Condition: IV

I would like to thank Atif Imtiaz, editor of the Bookviews section at DeenPort, for allowing me to reproduce a piece entitled "The Muslim Condition". I have serialised it into several parts and made some minor editions for the sake of presentation. May God reward his efforts. This is the fourth part of what will be a six part series.

Part IV: Ideology and identity politics
All of the above is an attempt [I, II, III] to outline a sociology of knowledge. I wish to distinguish between three different types of knowing: knowing of, knowing about and knowing. The first is a glancing kind of knowledge, it is the first post of threshold past ignorance. To know of is to have heard of the subject, but not much more. Perhaps a sentence or two on the subject are all that can be recalled. The second is a slightly more elaborate form of knowing, the subject matter is known, perhaps its relations with other subjects is also known; explanations, attributions, causes, histories could all be briefly provided. This kind of knowing involves being able to speak of the subject matter for a couple of minutes, but no more. The third kind of knowing is knowing itself. The subject is thoroughly understood; its history, relation, internal distinctions etc. are all familiar and if pursued then this kind of knowing could provide the substance for lengthy conversations.

The first and second kind of knowing are provided in the main by the media whereas the third can only be attained through individual study and it would be a personal guess to suggest that most of current modern knowledge is of the first and second kinds. Since September 11, the popular transition in relation to the knowing of Islam and Muslims is that now many people can talk about Islam and Muslims for about half an hour but it would be a totally prejudicial conversation – as such shallow or sham forms of prejudice have become fortified. This is developing while we Muslims have little control over what is known about us since sections of the media are communicating about us on our behalf. In this sense there is a cultural objectification that is developing when in fact a form of cultural inclusion is required. This does not represent the total trend, however, it is an important aspect of the present state of affairs. The only antidote against this social poison is our own personal behaviour - our behaviour communicates, it can confirm or deny, whether it is in the form of a casual glance or a lack of morality.

I have written in a very general way about the media representation of Islam in the recent past. I wish to focus however on one consequence of this representation that is a direct result of this continuous stream of representations: ideology. Macro-politics and its depiction almost necessitates an ideological response. This was certainly evidenced in the early nineties after the first Gulf war and the war in former Yugoslavia. It can also be evidenced by the success of two forms of associations within the Muslim public sphere: ideological organisations and charities. Both depend upon the repeated imagery of Muslim victimhood. This may be justified in that many of the world’s problems are Muslim related and that many of the world's victims are Muslims, furthermore any response that does not feel the suffering of fellow Muslims is surely lacking in basic matters since it is a sign of faith to feel for fellow Muslims. However, this does not represent the total story of the Muslim predicament which with over one billion followers is extremely complicated and cannot be reduced to the single story of victimhood especially as James notes: "…if hostile to light irony, religion is equally hostile to heavy grumbling and complaint" (p. 38) [1]. That both charities and ideological organisations rely upon such imagery for their success is problematic. Both protagonists would no doubt suggest that such methods are the only methods they have available, but what does the continued focus upon such imagery do to the Muslim psyche?

These ideological groupings are in the main protest movements, interestingly all function in the English language, are based mostly around the campuses, involve a rejection of corruption within the community and specifically amongst the elders and critique the lack of religious practise amongst Muslims. The ideological groupings are in essence an 'outside Islam' – a young man as he views his community on a local and global scale adopts a vision that takes his focus away from his immediate surroundings towards some global/complete solution to all problems – this 'outside Islam' even takes the young man's focus away from his self as his criticism focuses on others that have forced this situation upon him.

These groups share a similar philosophical approach even if they disagree in their conclusions. However, even their disagreements have become reduced over the last few years. The intense pressure of daily scrutiny and criticism has lead to a peculiar situation in the Muslim community in which salafis are talking about education, Hizb ut Tehrir is working on drug rehabilitation, the Muslim Association of Britain has a national, public profile and the Islamic Society of Britain has close relations with a Labour government. One can hear the proverbial bus conductors shouting: 'All change!' What this means is that we are moving beyond our ideological phase – ideology has served its purpose and the demands of a new generation are more exacting as questions are asked as to relevance and utility.

A problem remains, though, in that the sum total of these ideological groupings begins to create a climate of ideological opinion that because it is supported across the board becomes fairly resilient to criticism. There develops a synergy as well in which this climate spreads its influence to people outside of these groupings and I would wish to suggest that the consequences of the mass adherence to such opinion in the long term are serious. The sum total of this synergy I will label as Muslim identity politics and this lends its colour to the temperament of the community as it mixes with religious adherence in a variety of ways, almost all negative and inauthentic. This is a kind of temperament that we should question. This returns me to my central question: What is in the Muslim mind? If it is occupied by highly convoluted arguments with suggested anathemas then the words, the facts, figures, rhetoric and feelings will shape the extent of the depth of his religion. This is a form of psychological engagement that privileges the mind and language – it is shallow religion. The centre of psychological work according to Muslim ontology though is the heart and we are constituted as nafs or ruh according to our efforts [2]. Why is this important?

© S. M. Atif Imtiaz

[Read Part I, Part II, Part III, Part V and Part VI of this series.]

Notes
[1] James, W. The Varieties of Religious Experience.
[2] For an exposition of Islamic psychology, see Disciplining the Soul by Imam Ghazali.